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This paper investigates under which conditions governments strategically commit to strin-
gent environmental policies in order to balance market power and the damages emerging from
the externality. We compare social welfare under two policy regimes: a ￿ exible and in￿ exible
environmental policy. Our results show that an in￿ exible policy becomes socially optimal when
its associated welfare loss, due to a stringent fee across time, is smaller than its welfare gain,
which arises from an improved environmental quality since only one ￿rm operates in the mar-
ket. Otherwise, the regulator optimally chooses a ￿ exible environmental policy which cannot
credibly deter entry. In addition, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and
incumbent are not necessarily aligned regarding policy regimes. In particular, under certain
conditions the regulator ￿nds socially optimal to commit to an in￿ exible policy, which deters
entry, whereas the incumbent would actually prefer a ￿ exible policy that attracts entry.
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11 Introduction
Recent studies have stressed the potential e⁄ects that environmental policy has on market structure
and competition. These studies can be grouped according to the primitive reason that explains
why environmental regulation hinders entry and/or limits competition upon entry. On one hand,
Ryan (2011) and OECD (2006) show that certain types of environmental regulation increase the
initial investment that entrants must incur in order to start operating in an industry, thus reducing
entry.1 On the other hand, similar studies demonstrate that environmental policies impose cost
di⁄erentials among ￿rms. Speci￿cally, these papers identify the presence of strong economies of
scale in the compliance of environmental policy, entailing a cost di⁄erential between incumbents
and entrants if their scale of operations di⁄ers.2 Furthermore, such cost di⁄erential can be further
augmented since environmental policy often places a heavier burden on new pollutant sources than
on the incumbents￿ .3
This paper investigates the e⁄ect of environmental policy on market entry, showing that environ-
mental regulation may be detrimental for competition, even in the absence of the above arguments.
Our results therefore emphasize that the potential adverse e⁄ects of environmental regulation are
not restricted to industries with particular production processes, or to markets where environ-
mental policy exhibits administrative economies of scale, or settings where incumbent and entrant
￿rms are di⁄erently a⁄ected by regulation. Instead, our ￿ndings highlight the fact that such entry-
deterrence e⁄ects can be extended to industries where ￿rms are symmetric in costs and they are
similarly a⁄ected by environmental policy.
In particular, our study considers a social planner who imposes emission fees on an industry,
initially monopolized by an incumbent ￿rm, and where an entrant may decide to enter afterwards.
For generality, we allow the regulator to choose among two policy regimes: a ￿ exible policy, where
authorities adapt the stringency of the emission fee if the number of polluting ￿rms operating in
the industry changes, and an in￿ exible policy, whereby the regulator does not have the ability to
rapidly revise his environmental policy if the market structure changes. Since under an in￿ exible
policy initial fees are still enforced in the post-entry game, this policy can attract or deter entry
when the regulator commits to a relatively low or high fee, respectively. In contrast, ￿ exible policy
cannot credibly deter entry, since the regulator has incentives to revise emission fees if entry ensues.
We ￿rst show that, under a ￿ exible policy, the regulator imposes more stringent fees to duopolists
than to the incumbent monopolist; as in Buchanan (1969). Under an in￿ exible policy, by contrast,
the social planner must commit to a single emission fee, thereby producing ine¢ ciencies in either
one or both periods. Under certain conditions, however, the regulator can improve social welfare
1In particular, Ryan (2011) found that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the sunk entry cost by
35% in the market of Portland cement. He argues that, despite the increased pro￿tability in this sector, few entrants
chose to enter the industry.
2See, for instance, Ungson et al. (1985), Brock and Evans (1985), Dean et al. (2000) and Helland and Matsuno
(2003). In this line of work, Monty (1991) and Dean and Brown (1995) report learning-by-doing e⁄ects in the com-
pliance of environmental regulation, emphasizing the cost advantage of incumbent ￿rms who are already familiarized
with the administrative details of the policy.
3Stavins (2005) provides a comprehensive survey on the impact of vintage-di⁄erentiation regulation.
2by strategically committing to a signi￿cantly high fee that deters entry. In particular, relative to
a ￿ exible policy, the imposition of a stringent in￿ exible fee produces two opposite e⁄ects: ￿rst,
it reduces monopoly output during both periods, but second, it improves environmental quality
by limiting pollution. When the latter e⁄ect dominates the former, overall welfare increases, and
therefore entry-deterrence becomes socially optimal. This occurs when entry costs are high, since
in this setting entry can easily be deterred by setting a relatively low fee which does not entail
signi￿cant welfare losses. Entry deterrence is further facilitated when the environmental damage
from pollution is relatively high. Indeed, entry-deterrence reduces output, which entails an envi-
ronmental bene￿t from a lower level of pollution that is further emphasized as it becomes more
damaging. Otherwise, entry deterrence becomes extremely costly and/or does not entail signi￿cant
environmental bene￿ts. Attracting entry is thus socially optimal and the regulator selects a ￿ exible
environmental policy.
Our results hence identify under which conditions the regulator might strategically commit to
a relatively stringent environmental policy that, despite hindering the entry of additional ￿rms in
subsequent periods, can ultimately lead to welfare improvements. Such equilibrium outcome, how-
ever, assumes that regulatory authorities can directly modify the ￿ exibility of their environmental
policies. If such degree of ￿ exibility is given by the country￿ s institutional context, our results
suggest that countries where environmental regulation slowly adapts to changes in the regulated
industry could be unintentionally hindering entry. The use of in￿ exible policy, however, would not
be necessarily suboptimal if, speci￿cally, entry costs and the environmental damage from pollution
are relatively high.4
Finally, we investigate whether the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts are positively a⁄ected by emission fees
that deter entry. An in￿ exible policy allows the incumbent to maintain its monopoly power, but
reduces pro￿ts across time. We show that, when entry is deterred by setting a low in￿ exible emission
fee (i.e., entry costs are large), the incumbent￿ s bene￿ts from monopolizing the industry outweigh
the costs from bearing a stringent regulation, and hence the incumbent prefers an in￿ exible policy.
In contrast, when entry-deterrence is more di¢ cult (small entry costs), emission fees become more
substantial; implying that the incumbent prefers a ￿ exible policy even if it attracts entry. We
furthermore demonstrate that the regulator￿ s and incumbent￿ s interests are not necessarily aligned.
In particular, when the regulator ￿nds entry-deterrence socially optimal, the incumbent also favors
such policy if the emission fee it bears is relatively small, but opposes it otherwise. Our results
hence provide an important distinction often overlooked by critics of environmental policy, who
regard it as a tool governments use to protect domestic monopolies from entry and competition.
Indeed, our predictions show that the interests of regulatory agencies and incumbent ￿rms might
be aligned, but only when entry is relatively easy to deter. Otherwise, the incumbent may actually
prefer that the regulator practices less entry deterrence.
4That is, even if the regulator had the ability to choose a policy regime (￿ exible or in￿ exible policies), he would
prefer an in￿ exible policy. Note that if, in contrast, countries￿given institutional setting is relatively ￿ exible, our
results predict that such regulation would attract additional ￿rms in the industry, yielding optimal social welfare if
entry costs and the environmental damage from pollution are su¢ ciently low.
3Related literature. Our paper contributes to three main areas of the literature: that analyzing
the e⁄ects of environmental policy on entry and competition; that considering the optimal use of
commitment in contexts where regulators face time-inconsistency problems; and the literature that
examines entry-deterrence in industrial economics. As suggested above, our paper o⁄ers a new
setting where environmental regulation can serve as an entry-deterrence device, even in the absence
of any of the arguments commonly used in the literature: economies of scale or learning-by-doing
e⁄ects in the compliance of regulation, cost-di⁄erentials emerging from environmental policy, etc.
Moreover, the paper contributes to the literature comparing ￿ exible and in￿ exible policies.
Since the initial work by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), several
papers examined perfect commitment in monetary policy, Chang (1998) and Alvarez et al. (2004),
in capital tax policy, Chamley (1986) and Benhabib et al. (2001), or in both, Dixit and Lambertini
(2003). These papers consider a context where in￿ exible policies can be welfare improving under
certain conditions. Commitment in monetary policy, for instance, a⁄ects agents￿expectations of
in￿ ation thereby changing their current economic decisions. This paper similarly identi￿es how
commitment in environmental policy can be used to a⁄ect the entrant￿ s expectations about its
future pro￿tability, deterring entry in certain contexts and increasing overall welfare.5
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on entry-deterrence games initiated by Bain (1956)
and Sylos-Labini (1962) for one incumbent and extended by Gilbert and Vives (1986) to several
incumbents, by Waldman (1987) to settings of incomplete information, and by Kovenoch and Roy
(2005) to product-di⁄erentiated markets.6 A common assumption in these models is that the in-
cumbent ￿rm commits to a particular level of output which, if su¢ ciently large, may deter entry
from potential entrants. In our paper, the incumbent ￿rm cannot commit its future production
decision, whereas the regulator can set a constant emission fee across periods, thereby using envi-
ronmental policy as an entry-deterrence tool in certain contexts. An important di⁄erence of our
model is that the regulator deters entry in settings where the incumbent would have preferred entry
to ensue. Because the literature on entry-deterrence often abstracts from the regulatory context
in which ￿rms operate, entry is only deterred if the incumbent seeks to discourage the newcomer.
Our results, in contrast, predict settings where entry deterrence is favored by the incumbent, but
also contexts where it is actually opposed by the incumbent ￿rm.
The next section describes the model and time structure of the game. Section 3 examines
the second-period game, while section 4 investigates the ￿rst-period game both with ￿ exible and
in￿ exible policies. Section 5 compares the overall social welfare ensuing from the selection of
di⁄erent environmental policies. At the end of section 5 we evaluate the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts under
5Ko et al. (1992) compare ￿ exible and in￿ exible environmental policies under a complete information context
where a single incumbent produces stock externalities, i.e., pollution that does not fully dissipate across periods,
without allowing for potential entry. Because entry cannot occur in their setting, the optimal policy path across
periods mainly depends on the dissipation rate. In our model, in contrast, pollution fully dissipates across periods
but entry may occur, thus a⁄ecting the social planner￿ s optimal policy path with and without commitment.
6In a reinterpretation of the quantity commitments considered in these papers on entry-deterrence, Spence (1977),
Dixit (1980), Ware (1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), assume that incumbent ￿rms commit to an investment
in capacity, providing similar results.
4￿ exible and in￿ exible policies, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an entry game with a monopolist incumbent, an entrant who decides whether or not to
join the market and a regulator who sets an emission fee per unit of output.7 The incumbent￿ s
constant marginal costs are either high H or low L, i.e., cH
inc > cL
inc ￿ 0, where subscript inc denotes
the incumbent. In particular, we study a two-stage complete-information game with the following
time structure:
1. In the ￿rst stage, the regulator chooses between an in￿ exible environmental policy (setting a
constant fee t across time); and a ￿ exible policy, i.e., setting fee t1 (t2) in the ￿rst (second)
period.
2. Given the ￿rst-period environmental policy, the incumbent responds selecting an output level,
i.e., qK(t) under an in￿ exible policy or qK(t1) under a ￿ exible policy, where K = fH;Lg
represents the incumbent￿ s type.
3. In the second-period game, the entrant decides whether to enter the industry after observing
the regulator￿ s choice of environmental policy and the incumbent￿ s marginal costs.
4. The regulator maintains his environmental policy t if he is committed to a constant fee.
Otherwise, he revises the policy from t1 to t2. In addition:
(a) If entry does not occur, the incumbent responds producing a monopoly output x
K;NE
inc (t)
under an in￿ exible policy and x
K;NE
inc (t2) under a ￿ exible policy; where superscript NE
denotes no entry.





ent (t) under an in￿ exible policy, and x
K;E
inc (t2) and x
K;E
ent (t2) under a ￿ exible policy;
where superscript E represents entry and subscript ent denotes the entrant.
In the following section we examine fees and output levels in the second-period game, as well
as the resulting social welfare in equilibrium. Afterwards we analyze the ￿rst stage, and ￿nally
compare social welfare under ￿ exible and in￿ exible policies.
3 Second-period game
Flexible policy. Let us next examine the subgame where the regulator selects a ￿ exible environ-
mental policy.
7As described below, our model allows for emissions to be a convex function of output, embodying not only cases
in which the relationship between output and emissions is proportional, but also cases in which such relationship is
increasing.
5No entry. If entry does not occur, the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts when facing a given fee t2 are
￿
K;NE





xinc, where K = fH;Lg, and the inverse demand function
p(xinc) is linear in output and satis￿es p0 (xinc) < 0 and p(xinc) > cK
inc for all xinc. The regulator￿ s
social welfare function in the second period is
SW
K;NE
2 ￿ ￿CS(xinc) + ￿
K;NE




p(x)dx ￿ p(xinc)xinc represents the consumer surplus for a given output
xinc. The parameter ￿ denotes the weight that the social planner assigns to consumer surplus and
￿ 2 [0;1]. In addition, TK;NE is the tax revenue under no entry, and function d(xinc) represents
the strictly convex environmental damage from output, where d0 (xinc) > 0 and d00 (xinc) > 0.8
Furthermore, we assume that the marginal environmental damage satis￿es p(0) ￿ cK
inc > d0(0),
which ensures that it is socially e¢ cient to produce the ￿rst unit of output. The regulator seeks to
induce the socially optimal output x
K;NE
SO which solves MBK;NE(xinc) = MDNE(xinc), where
MBK;NE(xinc) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p0(xinc)xinc + p(xinc) ￿ cK
inc (3.2)
represents the marginal bene￿t of additional output on consumer and producer surplus, whereas
MDNE(xinc) ￿ d0(xinc) denotes the marginal environmental damage of output. The regulator






SO ) on monopoly output in order to induce
the production level x
K;NE
SO in the second period, where MP
K;NE
inc (xinc) represents the marginal
pro￿ts of increasing xinc given no entry.9
Entry. If entry occurs, ￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists in the second period. The pro￿t
functions for the incumbent and entrant are
￿
K;E







ent (xinc;xent) ￿ p(X)xent￿(cent + t2)xent
(3.3)
where X = xinc + xent represents the aggregate output level, superscript E denotes entry and cent
is the entrant￿ s marginal cost where cent = cH
inc. The regulator￿ s social welfare function is
SW
K;E
2 ￿ ￿CS(X) + PS(X) + TK;E ￿ d(X). (3.4)




ent (xinc;xent)￿F. The regulator aims to induce the aggregate
8Note that this damage function allows for aggregate emissions to be a convex function of output, and in turn,
overall damage from pollution to be a convex function of aggregate emissions. That is, emissions can be represented
as ei = f(xinc), where f(￿) is weakly convex in xinc, and environmental damage as d(xinc) = g(f(xinc)), where g(￿)
is also a weakly convex function in emissions.
9Appendix 1 shows that such an emission fee exists both under entry and no entry. In addition, note that when
social welfare does not include consumer surplus, ￿ = 0, the optimal tax leads the incumbent to fully internalize the
environmental damage of her output decision. However, when ￿ > 0, the relative value of consumption increases,
which implies a lower optimal tax t
K;NE
2 . Therefore, the monopolist only internalizes a fraction of her environmental
damage.
6socially optimal output X
K;E
SO that solves MBK;E(X) = MDE(X), where
MBK;E(X) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p0(X)X + p(X) ￿ cK
inc (3.5)
and MDE(X) ￿ d0(X). Hence, the emission fee t
K;E























denotes the marginal pro￿t that ￿rm j obtains by increasing its duopoly output given that its rival
k produces the socially optimal output10 x
K;E
k;SO.
To make entry decision interesting, we consider that when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, entry
is unpro￿table, i.e., the entrant￿ s duopoly pro￿ts, ￿
L;E
ent (t), lie below his ￿xed entry cost F, ￿
L;E
ent (t) <
F, for any emission fee t. Hence, the entrant stays out even when emission fees are absent, i.e.,
￿
L;E
ent (0) < F. In contrast, when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, entry is pro￿table in equilibrium
both under the ￿ exible and in￿ exible fee. As section 4.2 shows, the ￿ exible fee is more stringent
than the in￿ exible tax, thus implying that entrant￿ s pro￿ts are lower when the environmental policy




2 ) > F.11 Entry, however, becomes
unpro￿table if fees are su¢ ciently high. That is, ￿
H;E
ent (t) decreases in t and satis￿es ￿
H;E
ent (t) ￿ F
for all fees t ￿ t. For compactness, we refer to t as the ￿entry-deterring fee.￿
In￿exible policy. Under an in￿ exible policy, ￿rms face the same constant fee t that the regulator
selects in the ￿rst-period game, producing output x
K;NE
inc (t) in the case of no entry and x
K;E
j (t) for
any ￿rm j = finc;entg in the case of entry. Hence, we analyze the regulator￿ s setting of an optimal
in￿ exible policy in our discussion of the ￿rst-period game.
4 First-period game
4.1 Flexible policy
The regulator seeks a ￿rst-period output q that maximizes social welfare. Speci￿cally, this occurs
when the socially optimal output under monopoly qK
SO solves MBK;NE(q) = MDNE(q). Analogous




















denote the overall social welfare across both periods when












welfare when entry occurs given that the incumbent￿ s costs are high, and the regulator sets fees
10This implies that, when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, in order to ￿nd fee t
H;E























for both ￿rms j = finc;entg.




2 ) > F > ￿
L;E
ent (0), also satisfy the standard assumption
in entry-deterrence models where regulation is absent, in which F satis￿es ￿
H;E
ent (0) > F > ￿
L;E











2 . In order to illustrate our results, we develop the following example throughout the
paper.
Example. Consider an inverse demand function p(X) = 1 ￿ X and incumbent costs 1 >
cH
inc = cent > cL















SO , where K = fH;Lg. As a consequence,
the emission fee that induces qK
SO in the ￿rst period is tK
1 = (2d ￿ ￿)qK
SO. The optimal fee in the
second period when the incumbent￿ s costs are high is t
H;E








illustrating that the regulator sets more stringent fees to the duopolists than to the monopolist. If















1+2d when the regulator











1+2d ￿ F when he faces a high-cost
incumbent.13
4.2 In￿ exible policy
Let us now consider the subgame where the regulator chooses a constant tax policy. First, in the














2 under a ￿ exible policy. If entry occurs, however, the regulator needs to set
di⁄erent fees to the ￿rst-period monopolist than to the second-period duopolists in order to induce
the socially optimal aggregate output. Any ￿xed fee t therefore produces a deadweight loss in one
or both periods. Hence, in this setting the regulator minimizes the discounted sum of the absolute
value of deadweight losses across both periods, choosing a fee t that solves
min
t
jDWL1(t)j + ￿R jDWL2(t)j (4.1)
where ￿R 2 [0;1] denotes the regulator￿ s discount factor. The deadweight loss of tax t in the







dq, where output ~ qK;NE(t) solves
MP
K;NE
inc (q) = t, i.e., ~ qK;NE(t) is the monopoly pro￿t-maximizing output for a given fee t. Figure
1a below illustrates the ￿rst-period welfare loss of setting a fee t that di⁄ers from the socially
optimal fee tK
1 . In particular, ￿gure 1a depicts the case where t > tK
1 , leading to a monopoly
output ~ qK;NE(t) that lies below the socially optimal output qK
SO.14
12Intuitively, this implies that the importance that the social planner assigns to consumer surplus and environmental
damage must be relatively close. If instead, the environmental damage is extremely low (high) and the weight on
consumer surplus is high (low), the regulator would choose to not reduce output levels setting a zero fee (reduce
output to zero by setting a high fee, respectively).
13Since we analyze social welfare across two time periods, the example assumes no discounting of future payo⁄s.
14In order to allow for the case where t < t
K
1 , expression (6) considers the absolute value of the deadweight loss of
fee t.
8Figure 1a Figure 1b








dX, where e XK;E(t) = x
K;E
inc (t) + x
K;E











= t for all ￿rm j, i.e., x
K;E
j (t) represents ￿rm j￿ s pro￿t-maximizing
output for a given fee t after entry. Deadweight loss DWL2(t) is depicted in ￿gure 1b. Speci￿cally,
the constant fee t maps into MP
K;E
inc (￿), inducing the incumbent to produce x
K;E
inc (t). However,
DWL2(t) is calculated from aggregate duopoly output e XK;E(t).
Entry deterrence. In the context of an in￿ exible environmental policy, the regulator can
commit to a relatively high fee t that deters entry, i.e., a fee that lowers the entrant￿ s duopoly pro￿ts
below his ￿xed entry cost F. Let SWH;NE ￿
t
￿
denote overall social welfare when the incumbent￿ s
costs are high, and the regulator commits to a su¢ ciently high fee t that deters entry.15 Intuitively,
the welfare cost of deterring entry arises from substantially reducing the incumbent￿ s monopoly
output across both periods, thereby decreasing consumer surplus and pro￿ts, whereas its welfare
bene￿t emerges from the reduction in pollution and the savings in entry costs.
Example. Continuing with our example, and considering ￿R = 1 and ￿ = 1, the optimal tax
t that the regulator chooses across both periods is tL;NE = (2d ￿ 1)x
K;NE
SO when the incumbent￿ s
costs are low and therefore entry does not occur. In this case, the welfare-maximizing emission fee
15Note that the use of high fees can only serve to deter entry if environmental policy is in￿ exible along time. If,
in contrast, fees can be modi￿ed after the ￿rst period, entry cannot be credibly deterred. In addition, when the
incumbent￿ s costs are low, entry does not occur, and the regulator does not need to commit to a high emission fee t
in order to deter entry. We hence restrict our analysis to the regulation of the high-cost incumbent.
9coincides with that under a ￿ exible policy, tL;NE = tL
1 = t
L;NE
2 . The regulator has no incentive to
revise the environmental policy because a monopoly is regulated at each stage. In contrast, when
the incumbent￿ s costs are high, entry occurs and the optimal tax is a weighted average of ￿rst- and





2 , and thus tH
1 < tH;E < t
H;E
2 . Finally, note that the
regulator can deter entry by setting a fee t that solves ￿
H;E




decreases as entry becomes more costly, thus facilitating entry deterrence; and it is positive for all
F < F￿ ￿
(1￿cH
inc)2


















The following lemma examines the regulator￿ s incentives to set entry-deterring fees where the
given institutional setting is in￿ exible.
Lemma 1. Under an in￿exible policy regime, the social welfare from committing to an entry-
deterring fee t, SWH;NE ￿
t
￿
, exceeds that from setting a fee tH;E that attracts entry, SWH;E ￿
tH;E￿
,






The ￿gure below represents cuto⁄ FInflex(d) for the case where cH
inc = 1
4. Intuitively, when
entry costs are higher than FInflex(d), entry can be deterred by committing to a low fee t, thereby
incurring a small welfare loss.17 In addition, as entry becomes more costly (higher F), entry-
deterrence can be sustained under a larger set of environmental damages, d. For (F;d)-pairs
below FInflex(d), in contrast, entry deterrence becomes more di¢ cult since fee t is high, thereby
producing a large welfare loss, without entailing a substantial environmental bene￿t given that d
is small. Hence, allowing entry is socially optimal.
16It is straightforward to show that this fee generates strictly positive production levels for both incumbent and
entrant across periods. In addition, as the ￿R ! 0, the weight on t
H
1 increases and that on t
H;E
2 decreases. Intuitively,
the social planner assigns no value to the future deadweight loss and therefore selects a fee that minimizes deadweight
loss in the ￿rst-period game.
17Note that the entry-deterring fee t is strictly positive since cuto⁄ F









values; as shown in the proof of Lemma 1.









Blockaded entry. For comparison purposes, ￿gure 2 also includes the threshold under which
entry costs are su¢ ciently high, making entry unpro￿table under a ￿ exible policy t
H;E









and entry is blockaded. Importantly, note that cuto⁄ FInflex(d) lies below the
threshold for which entry is blockaded, allowing the regulator to practice entry deterrence if entry
costs are intermediate. In our parametric example, for instance, the threshold for which entry is













We can now examine the ￿rst period of the game, where the regulator chooses between a ￿ exible
and an in￿ exible policy. Furthermore, if an in￿ exible policy is selected, the regulator needs to decide
whether to set a su¢ ciently high fee t that deters entry. As described above, when the incumbent￿ s
costs are low, entry does not occur, and optimal emission fees coincide in both policy regimes,
yielding similar welfare. When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, however, emission fees not only
di⁄er in both policy settings, but also allow for the use of the emission fee as an entry-deterrence
device.
Let us ￿nally introduce additional notation. Let FFlex(d) represent the entry cost that makes











. In our above
parametric example, cuto⁄ FFlex(d) lies above cuto⁄ FInflex(d) under all feasible values of d; as
depicted in ￿gure 3.18 Intuitively, a regulator is less willing to bear the welfare loss of deterring entry
18See proof of Proposition 1 for more details. To facilitate the comparison with ￿gure 2, the ￿gure also considers
11when he chooses a ￿ exible policy than when he is already committed to a constant environmental
policy. The following proposition summarizes the regulator￿ s policy choice in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game. For presentation purposes, let region I represent entry costs where F <
FInflex(d) (see ￿gure 3), region II the case in which FInflex(d) < F < FFlex(d), region III denote


























Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the regulator selects:









































3. A ￿exible policy that blockades entry in region IV.
The regulator￿ s decision can therefore be divided into four regions. When entry costs are su¢ -
ciently low, F < FInflex(d), he prefers to set a ￿ exible policy, since it yields a larger social welfare





4. Di⁄erent cost parameters yield similar comparisons, and can be provided by the authors upon request.
12entry can only be deterred by committing to a relatively stringent fee t, which reduces the incum-
bent￿ s monopoly output during both periods, thus signi￿cantly decreasing consumer and producer
surplus. Furthermore, deterring entry entails a small bene￿t since the environmental damage from
pollution, d, is relatively small in this region. As a consequence, the welfare loss from setting t
o⁄sets its associated environmental bene￿ts, and a ￿ exible environmental policy is welfare supe-
rior. A similar argument holds when entry costs are moderately low, FInflex(d) < F < FFlex(d) in
region II, where ￿ exible policies also yield a larger welfare.19 When entry costs are relatively high,
however, social welfare can be maximized by deterring entry. In region III, entry can be deterred
by imposing a relatively low t, thereby incurring small welfare losses from reducing the incumbent￿ s
monopoly output. In addition, such output reduction entails signi￿cant environmental bene￿ts,
provided that d is relatively high, which ultimately increases overall welfare. Our results hence sug-
gest that governments maintain ￿ exible environmental policies in industries with low entry costs
and small environmental damages ￿ which facilitates entry￿ but commit to relatively high fees
otherwise, thus hindering entry.
Finally, the region under which entry deterrence becomes socially optimal (region III) shrinks

















￿ FFlex(d). Intuitively, when the
entrant is more ine¢ cient, its pro￿ts upon entry decrease, making him less attracted to the market,
and hence the regulator￿ s task of deterring entry becomes less necessary.
Incumbent pro￿ts. From a policy perspective, the setting of stringent environmental policies
is commonly regarded as a tool governments may use to deter entry and promote the pro￿ts of
domestic monopolies. The next corollary shows that this is not necessarily true in our model.
Corollary 1. The pro￿ts of the high-cost incumbent are larger when the regulator sets an entry-




In particular, fee t helps the incumbent maintain her monopoly power, but signi￿cantly reduces
her output and pro￿ts during both periods. As a consequence, the high-cost incumbent prefers that
the regulator deters entry only when fee t, and thus the pro￿t loss that she must bear, is relatively
small. This speci￿cally occurs when entry is easy to deter, i.e., entry costs are relatively high. In
particular, ￿gure 4 superimposes cuto⁄ FProfits(d) on ￿gure 3, identifying the region where the
incumbent prefers to bear a stringent fee t in order to deter entry, when F > FProfits(d), or she
prefers entry otherwise (shaded area).
19The di⁄erence with region I arises o⁄-the-equilibrium path since, if the regulator commits to a constant environ-
mental policy, social welfare is now larger by setting an entry-deterrence fee t than by commiting to fee t
H;E.
13Figure 4. Pro￿ts in the entry-deterring equilibrium.









. Therefore, the regulator and incumbent￿ s preferences are aligned when entry costs








in ￿gure 4. The shaded area rep-
resents, in contrast, parameter combinations under which deterring entry is sequentially rational
for the regulator, i.e., F > FFlex(d), but such practice imposes a signi￿cant pro￿t loss on the
incumbent, thereby diminishing her overall pro￿ts. In summary, when entry costs are su¢ ciently
high, F > FProfits(d), both the regulator and the high-cost incumbent are willing to bear the
cost of a stringent environmental policy in order to deter entry. In contrast, when entry costs are
relatively low (in the shaded area), entry-deterrence becomes costly, implying that the incumbent
prefers entry rather than bearing the large cost of the strict fee t that avoids entry, whereas the
regulator still ￿nds entry-deterrence socially optimal.
6 Conclusions
Our paper examines under which conditions governments strategically commit to relatively strin-
gent environmental policies in order to maximize social welfare. We show that entry deterrence
becomes socially optimal when its associated welfare loss, due to committing to a stringent fee
across time, is smaller than its welfare gain, which arises from an improved environmental quality.
Otherwise, the regulator optimally chooses a ￿ exible environmental policy which cannot credibly
deter entry. In addition, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and incumbent
are not necessarily aligned regarding entry deterrence. In particular, under certain conditions the
14regulator ￿nds socially optimal to commit to an in￿ exible policy that deters entry whereas the
incumbent would actually prefer a ￿ exible policy that attracts entry.
The paper assumes that the entrant observes the incumbent￿ s costs. In di⁄erent settings, how-
ever, the entrant might not have access to this information, thereby inferring the incumbent￿ s type
after observing not only the incumbent￿ s production decision but also the regulator￿ s environmental
policy. In such context, environmental regulation can facilitate or hinder the incumbent￿ s informa-
tion transmission. In addition, we consider a single incumbent, which could be modi￿ed to allow
for multiple incumbents; as in Gilbert and Vives (1986). Unlike their work, however, free-riding
incentives are absent in our model since the incumbents￿output choices do not condition entry de-
cisions. Finally, our paper can be extended to the analysis of non-polluting goods. In this case, the
regulator would not impose taxes but rather provide subsidies in order to induce ￿rms to produce
the socially optimal output.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1
Let us analyze the existence of socially optimal output and emission fees under complete informa-
tion.
Second period, No entry. The socially optimal output under monopoly x
K;NE
SO solves






= (1 ￿ ￿)p0(x)x + p(x) ￿ cK
inc
and MDNE(x) ￿ d0(x). Socially optimal output under monopoly x
K;NE
SO exists if MBK;NE(0) >
MDNE(0), which holds since p(0) ￿ cK



















@xinc . Note that
t
K;NE
2 is decreasing in costs. In particular, an increase in costs shifts the MP
K;NE
inc (xinc) function
downwards, decreasing the value of x
K;NE
SO that solves MBK;NE(x) = MDNE(x). Given that




Second period, Entry. The socially optimal aggregate output under duopoly X
K;E
SO solves
MBK;E(X) = MDE(X), where
MBK;E(X) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p0(X)X + p(X) ￿ cK
inc
and MDE(X) ￿ d0(X) where X = xinc + xent. In addition, MBK;E(X) is decreasing in X since
its slope is (2 ￿ ￿)p0(X) given linear demand, which is negative since ￿ ￿ 1, and MDE(X) is
increasing in X since its slope is d00(X) > 0. Optimal aggregate output under duopoly X
K;E
SO exists
15if MBK;E(0) > MDE(0), which holds since p(0)￿cK
inc > d0(0). The emission fee t
K;E
2 that induces





























@xj for all ￿rm j 6= k. Note that t
K;E
2 is decreasing in the




2 . In particular, an increase in the incumbent￿ s costs decreases
X
K;E

















where p ￿ p(X) and p00 = 0 given that demand is linear. Given that MDE(X) is una⁄ected by the
change in costs and it is increasing in X, the optimal value of t
K;E
2 decreases.
First period. The socially optimal output under ￿rst-period monopoly qK
SO solves MBK;NE(q) =
MDNE(q), where
MBK;NE(q) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p0(q)q + p(q) ￿ cK
inc
and MDNE(q) ￿ d0(q). By a similar argument as for t
K;E
2 emission fee tK
1 exists and is decreasing
in costs. ￿
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Under an in￿ exible policy regime, the social welfare from setting a constant entry-deterring fee



















during both periods. If, in contrast, the regulator selects a constant fee tH;E, entry ensues, yielding
an overall social welfare of
SWH;E(tH;E) =





Hence, the regulator prefers to deter entry, i.e., SWH;NE(t) > SWH;E(tH;E), if F > FInflex(d),
where
FInflex(d) ￿
1310 + 8d(557 + 459d) ￿ 60
p
2(1 ￿ cH
inc)2G ￿ 2(1 + 2d)(655 + 918d)(2 ￿ cH
inc)cH
inc
25(5 + 28d + 36d2)
and G ￿
￿
(1 + 2d)3(205 + 18d)
￿1
2. First, note that cuto⁄ FInflex(d) is decreasing in d for all costs
cH
inc 2 (0;1). Second, cuto⁄ FInflex(d) lies below F￿ ￿ (1￿cH
inc)
2









557 ￿ 30(1 ￿ cH
inc)2p




which is lower than F￿ ￿ (1￿cH
inc)
2
9 , which is constant in d, for all costs cH
inc 2 (0;1). Third, cuto⁄











2 ) = (1￿cH
inc)
2





which lies above FInflex ￿1
2
￿
; and reaches its lowest value at d = 1, (1￿cH
inc)
2
36 , which also lies






625(1+2d) , satisfy ￿
H;E




2 ) since tH;E < t
H;E
2 , i.e., tH;E is less
stringent than t
H;E









2 ) < ￿
H;E
ent (tH;E).
Finally, note that pro￿ts ￿
H;E
ent (tH;E) lie below cuto⁄ F￿. Indeed, ￿
H;E
ent (tH;E) reaches its highest





625 , which is lower than cuto⁄ F￿. Since F￿ is constant in d, then F￿ >
￿
H;E
ent (tH;E) under all parameter values. ￿
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Second period. Under no entry, the K-type incumbent solves
max
xinc











2 for any fee t set by the regulator (notice that this
allows for ￿ exible and in￿ exible policies). Similarly, under entry, the incumbent solves
max
xinc






whereas the entrant solves a similar problem, where his marginal production costs are high. In











3 . In this context, the socially optimal output
XK
SO that solves MBK;NE(x) = MDNE(x), which implies ￿(1 ￿ ￿)x + (1 ￿ x) ￿ cK












. Under no entry, the regulator can induce XK
SO by










Similarly, under entry, the social planner seeks to induce the same socially optimal output XK
SO.
This implies that, in order to ￿nd fee t
K;E
























both ￿rms j = finc;entg. In the context of our example, this implies t
H;E

















the entrant, implying that entry is blockaded when the ￿xed entry costs, F, are su¢ ciently high,
i.e., F > (1￿cH
inc)
2







2A , where A ￿ 2 + 2d ￿ ￿ and B ￿ 1 ￿ 2d + ￿. This fee and the resulting
duopoly output are positive as long the di⁄erence between the incumbent￿ s and entrant￿ s cost is





A , where D ￿ 1 + 2d ￿ ￿.
First period. Since the incumbent operates as a monopolist in the ￿rst-period game, she
chooses output function qK(t) =
1￿(cK
inc+t)
2 for any fee t. Given this output function, under a
￿ exible environmental policy the regulator sets a ￿rst-period fee tK









2+2d￿￿, i.e., fee tK
1 = (2d ￿ ￿)qK
SO. Under
an in￿ exible policy, the regulator sets a fee tL;NE when the incumbent￿ s costs are low (and thus he
anticipates no entry to ensue in the second period) where tL;NE coincides with ￿rst- and second-
period fees under no entry, i.e., tL;NE = tL
1 = t
L;NE
2 . In contrast, when the incumbent￿ s costs are
high, the regulator anticipates entry in the following period, thus setting a fee tH;E that minimizes







1 < tH;E < t
H;E
2 . In this setting, however, the regulator can choose to commit to an entry-deterring
fee t such that ￿
H;E
ent (t) < F for all t > t. In particular, given that ￿
H;E
ent (t) = 1
9(1 ￿ cent ￿ t)2, the






= F is t = 1 ￿ cH
inc ￿ 3
p





Finally, the regulator chooses whether to maintain a ￿ exible policy across periods or to commit
to a given emission fee and, if so, whether to allow or deter entry. When the incumbent￿ s costs are
low, entry does not occur, and thus the regulator maximizes social welfare by selecting a ￿ exible
policy. When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, however, entry ensues as long as the constant fee t















1+2d ￿ F, that of committing to a constant fee






50(1+2d) ￿ F, and that of committing to an





















when F < FFlex(d), where
FFlex(d) ￿
  ￿ 48(1 ￿ cH
inc)2(1 + 2d)3=2 ￿ R
(5 + 28d + 36d2)2
and   ￿ 52 + 16d(11 + 9d) and R ￿ 4(1 + 2d)(13 + 18d)(2 ￿ cH
inc)cH






when F > FInflex(d), as described in Lemma 1, and FInflex(d) < FFlex(d). This


























, and the regulator also sets





















, and the regulator commits to an in￿ exible fee t that de-








, entry is blockaded and the regulator selects a ￿ exible
environmental policy. ￿
7.4 Proof of Corollary 1





4 during both the ￿rst and second period, where the high-cost incumbent produces
according to the monopoly output function qH(t) =
1￿cH
inc
2 during both periods, yielding an overall
pro￿t of 18F
4 .




￿rst and second-period, respectively, the high-cost incumbent￿ s pro￿ts become
(1￿cH
inc)2



















If the regulator selects an in￿ exible policy regime, with equilibrium fee tH;E, the high-cost
incumbent￿ s pro￿ts become
441(1￿cH
inc)2
625(1+2d)2 in the ￿rst period and
196(1￿cH
inc)2
625(1+2d)2 in the second period






625(1+2d)2 when ￿ = ￿ = 1.
Therefore, pro￿ts under the entry-deterring fee t are larger than under the in￿ exible fee tH;E for




In addition, note that cuto⁄ FProfits;Inflex(d) > FProfits;Flex(d), since the di⁄erence




is positive under all parameter values. Furthermore, ￿
H;E








is positive under all parameter values. Therefore, ￿
H;E
ent (tH;E) > FProfits;Inflex(d) > FProfits;Flex(d).
Hence, the region of parameter values under which the regulator prefers to practice entry deterrence
but the high-cost incumbent does not occurs when F < FProfits;Inflex(d). Otherwise, both agents
prefer the entry-deterring fee t. Therefore, only cuto⁄ FProfits;Inflex(d) is binding, and we denote
FProfits;Inflex(d) as FProfits(d). ￿
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